In #79570, `-Z split-dwarf-kind={none,single,split}` was replaced by `-C
split-debuginfo={off,packed,unpacked}`. `-C split-debuginfo`'s packed
and unpacked aren't exact parallels to single and split, respectively.
On Unix, `-C split-debuginfo=packed` will put debuginfo into object
files and package debuginfo into a DWARF package file (`.dwp`) and
`-C split-debuginfo=unpacked` will put debuginfo into dwarf object files
and won't package it.
In the initial implementation of Split DWARF, split mode wrote sections
which did not require relocation into a DWARF object (`.dwo`) file which
was ignored by the linker and then packaged those DWARF objects into
DWARF packages (`.dwp`). In single mode, sections which did not require
relocation were written into object files but ignored by the linker and
were not packaged. However, both split and single modes could be
packaged or not, the primary difference in behaviour was where the
debuginfo sections that did not require link-time relocation were
written (in a DWARF object or the object file).
This commit re-introduces a `-Z split-dwarf-kind` flag, which can be
used to pick between split and single modes when `-C split-debuginfo` is
used to enable Split DWARF (either packed or unpacked).
Signed-off-by: David Wood <david.wood@huawei.com>
This allows selecting `v0` symbol-mangling without an unstable option.
Selecting `legacy` still requires -Z unstable-options.
Continue supporting -Z symbol-mangling-version for compatibility for
now, but show a deprecation warning for it.
Import `SourceFile`s from crate before decoding foreign `Span`
Fixes#92163Fixes#92014
When writing to the incremental cache, we encode all `Span`s
we encounter, regardless of whether or not their `SourceFile`
comes from the local crate, or from a foreign crate.
When we decode a `Span`, we use the `StableSourceFileId` we encoded
to locate the matching `SourceFile` in the current session. If this
id corresponds to a `SourceFile` from another crate, then we need to
have already imported that `SourceFile` into our current session.
This usually happens automatically during resolution / macro expansion,
when we try to resolve definitions from other crates. In certain cases,
however, we may try to load a `Span` from a transitive dependency
without having ever imported the `SourceFile`s from that crate, leading
to an ICE.
This PR fixes the issue by enconding the `SourceFile`'s `CrateNum`
when we encode a `Span`. During decoding, we call `imported_source_files()`
when we encounter a foreign `CrateNum`, which ensure that all
`SourceFile`s from that crate are imported into the current session.
Add codegen option for branch protection and pointer authentication on AArch64
The branch-protection codegen option enables the use of hint-space pointer
authentication code for AArch64 targets.
Fixes#92163Fixes#92014
When writing to the incremental cache, we encode all `Span`s
we encounter, regardless of whether or not their `SourceFile`
comes from the local crate, or from a foreign crate.
When we decode a `Span`, we use the `StableSourceFileId` we encoded
to locate the matching `SourceFile` in the current session. If this
id corresponds to a `SourceFile` from another crate, then we need to
have already imported that `SourceFile` into our current session.
This usually happens automatically during resolution / macro expansion,
when we try to resolve definitions from other crates. In certain cases,
however, we may try to load a `Span` from a transitive dependency
without having ever imported the `SourceFile`s from that crate, leading
to an ICE.
This PR fixes the issue by calling `imported_source_files()`
when we encounter a `SourceFile` with a foreign `CrateNum`.
This ensures that all `SourceFile`s from that crate are imported
into the current session.
Enable `#[thread_local]` for all windows-msvc targets
As it stands, `#[thread_local]` is enabled haphazardly for msvc. It seems all 64-bit targets have it enabled, but not 32-bit targets unless they're also UWP targets (perhaps because UWP was added more recently?). So this PR simply enables it for 32-bit targets as well. I can't think of a reason not to and I've confirmed by running tests locally which pass.
See also #91659
Remove `SymbolStr`
This was originally proposed in https://github.com/rust-lang/rust/pull/74554#discussion_r466203544. As well as removing the icky `SymbolStr` type, it allows the removal of a lot of `&` and `*` occurrences.
Best reviewed one commit at a time.
r? `@oli-obk`
Add user seed to `-Z randomize-layout`
Allows users of -`Z randomize-layout` to provide `-Z layout-seed=<seed>` in order to further randomizing type layout randomization. Extension of [compiler-team/#457](https://github.com/rust-lang/compiler-team/issues/457), allows users to change struct layouts without changing code and hoping that item path hashes change, aiding in detecting layout errors
- Changed the separator from '+' to ','.
- Moved the branch protection options from -C to -Z.
- Additional test for incorrect branch-protection option.
- Remove LLVM < 12 code.
- Style fixes.
Co-authored-by: James McGregor <james.mcgregor2@arm.com>
Tokenize emoji as if they were valid identifiers
In the lexer, consider emojis to be valid identifiers and reject
them later to avoid knock down parse errors.
Partially address #86102.
LLVM has built-in heuristics for adding stack canaries to functions. These
heuristics can be selected with LLVM function attributes. This patch adds a
rustc option `-Z stack-protector={none,basic,strong,all}` which controls the use
of these attributes. This gives rustc the same stack smash protection support as
clang offers through options `-fno-stack-protector`, `-fstack-protector`,
`-fstack-protector-strong`, and `-fstack-protector-all`. The protection this can
offer is demonstrated in test/ui/abi/stack-protector.rs. This fills a gap in the
current list of rustc exploit
mitigations (https://doc.rust-lang.org/rustc/exploit-mitigations.html),
originally discussed in #15179.
Stack smash protection adds runtime overhead and is therefore still off by
default, but now users have the option to trade performance for security as they
see fit. An example use case is adding Rust code in an existing C/C++ code base
compiled with stack smash protection. Without the ability to add stack smash
protection to the Rust code, the code base artifacts could be exploitable in
ways not possible if the code base remained pure C/C++.
Stack smash protection support is present in LLVM for almost all the current
tier 1/tier 2 targets: see
test/assembly/stack-protector/stack-protector-target-support.rs. The one
exception is nvptx64-nvidia-cuda. This patch follows clang's example, and adds a
warning message printed if stack smash protection is used with this target (see
test/ui/stack-protector/warn-stack-protector-unsupported.rs). Support for tier 3
targets has not been checked.
Since the heuristics are applied at the LLVM level, the heuristics are expected
to add stack smash protection to a fraction of functions comparable to C/C++.
Some experiments demonstrating how Rust code is affected by the different
heuristics can be found in
test/assembly/stack-protector/stack-protector-heuristics-effect.rs. There is
potential for better heuristics using Rust-specific safety information. For
example it might be reasonable to skip stack smash protection in functions which
transitively only use safe Rust code, or which uses only a subset of functions
the user declares safe (such as anything under `std.*`). Such alternative
heuristics could be added at a later point.
LLVM also offers a "safestack" sanitizer as an alternative way to guard against
stack smashing (see #26612). This could possibly also be included as a
stack-protection heuristic. An alternative is to add it as a sanitizer (#39699).
This is what clang does: safestack is exposed with option
`-fsanitize=safe-stack`.
The options are only supported by the LLVM backend, but as with other codegen
options it is visible in the main codegen option help menu. The heuristic names
"basic", "strong", and "all" are hopefully sufficiently generic to be usable in
other backends as well.
Reviewed-by: Nikita Popov <nikic@php.net>
Extra commits during review:
- [address-review] make the stack-protector option unstable
- [address-review] reduce detail level of stack-protector option help text
- [address-review] correct grammar in comment
- [address-review] use compiler flag to avoid merging functions in test
- [address-review] specify min LLVM version in fortanix stack-protector test
Only for Fortanix test, since this target specifically requests the
`--x86-experimental-lvi-inline-asm-hardening` flag.
- [address-review] specify required LLVM components in stack-protector tests
- move stack protector option enum closer to other similar option enums
- rustc_interface/tests: sort debug option list in tracking hash test
- add an explicit `none` stack-protector option
Revert "set LLVM requirements for all stack protector support test revisions"
This reverts commit a49b74f92a4e7d701d6f6cf63d207a8aff2e0f68.
Try all stable method candidates first before trying unstable ones
Currently we try methods in this order in each step:
* Stable by value
* Unstable by value
* Stable autoref
* Unstable autoref
* ...
This PR changes it to first try pick methods without any unstable candidates, and if none is found, try again to pick unstable ones.
Fix#90320
CC #88971, hopefully would allow us to rename the "unstable_*" methods for integer impls back.
`@rustbot` label T-compiler T-libs-api
Leave -Z strip available temporarily as an alias, to avoid breaking
cargo until cargo transitions to using -C strip. (If the user passes
both, the -C version wins.)
Tweak the `options!` macro to allow for -Z and -C options with the same
name without generating conflicting internal parsing functions.
Split out of the commit stabilizing -Z strip as -C strip.
Added the --temps-dir option
Fixes#10971.
The new `--temps-dir` option puts intermediate files in a user-specified directory. This provides a fix for the issue where parallel invocations of rustc would overwrite each other's intermediate files.
No files are kept in the intermediate directory unless `-C save-temps=yes`.
If additional files are specifically requested using `--emit asm,llvm-bc,llvm-ir,obj,metadata,link,dep-info,mir`, these will be put in the output directory rather than the intermediate directory.
This is a backward-compatible change, i.e. if `--temps-dir` is not specified, the behavior is the same as before.
Don't abort compilation after giving a lint error
The only reason to use `abort_if_errors` is when the program is so broken that either:
1. later passes get confused and ICE
2. any diagnostics from later passes would be noise
This is never the case for lints, because the compiler has to be able to deal with `allow`-ed lints.
So it can continue to lint and compile even if there are lint errors.
Closes https://github.com/rust-lang/rust/issues/82761. This is a WIP because I have a feeling it will exit with 0 even if there were lint errors; I don't have a computer that can build rustc locally at the moment.
Add LLVM CFI support to the Rust compiler
This PR adds LLVM Control Flow Integrity (CFI) support to the Rust compiler. It initially provides forward-edge control flow protection for Rust-compiled code only by aggregating function pointers in groups identified by their number of arguments.
Forward-edge control flow protection for C or C++ and Rust -compiled code "mixed binaries" (i.e., for when C or C++ and Rust -compiled code share the same virtual address space) will be provided in later work as part of this project by defining and using compatible type identifiers (see Type metadata in the design document in the tracking issue #89653).
LLVM CFI can be enabled with -Zsanitizer=cfi and requires LTO (i.e., -Clto).
Thank you, `@eddyb` and `@pcc,` for all the help!
This commit adds LLVM Control Flow Integrity (CFI) support to the Rust
compiler. It initially provides forward-edge control flow protection for
Rust-compiled code only by aggregating function pointers in groups
identified by their number of arguments.
Forward-edge control flow protection for C or C++ and Rust -compiled
code "mixed binaries" (i.e., for when C or C++ and Rust -compiled code
share the same virtual address space) will be provided in later work as
part of this project by defining and using compatible type identifiers
(see Type metadata in the design document in the tracking issue #89653).
LLVM CFI can be enabled with -Zsanitizer=cfi and requires LTO (i.e.,
-Clto).
