Rollup merge of #40621 - jswalden:dependant-spelling-fix, r=sfackler
Fix a spelling error in HashMap documentation, and slightly reword surrounding text for precision Noticed while reading docs just now. It's possible that the prior wording *meant* to state that the seed's randomness depends on the exact instant that the system RNG was created, I guess. But unless there's an API guarantee that this is the case, the wording seems over-precise. Is there a formal API guarantee that would forbid, say, the system RNG from generating all output using the Intel RDRAND instruction? I don't think the quality of output in that case would depend on when the RNG was created. Yet it seems to me like it could well be a valid source of randomness when computing the initial seed. For that reason, tying the randomness of the seed, to the quality of the RNG's output *at the precise instant the seed is computed*, seems less confining. That instantaneous quality level could be determined by the quality at the instant the RNG was created -- but instantaneous quality need not be low for that precise reason.
This commit is contained in:
commit
9e11ecb750
@ -222,8 +222,8 @@ const DISPLACEMENT_THRESHOLD: usize = 128;
|
||||
/// resistance against HashDoS attacks. The algorithm is randomly seeded, and a
|
||||
/// reasonable best-effort is made to generate this seed from a high quality,
|
||||
/// secure source of randomness provided by the host without blocking the
|
||||
/// program. Because of this, the randomness of the seed is dependant on the
|
||||
/// quality of the system's random number generator at the time it is created.
|
||||
/// program. Because of this, the randomness of the seed depends on the output
|
||||
/// quality of the system's random number generator when the seed is created.
|
||||
/// In particular, seeds generated when the system's entropy pool is abnormally
|
||||
/// low such as during system boot may be of a lower quality.
|
||||
///
|
||||
|
Loading…
x
Reference in New Issue
Block a user